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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the court of appeals properly affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
Linnea Bennett where Linnea, as a beneficiary of a family trust, sued trustees Joseph 
Hughes and Eva Margurita Cafferty and obtained a benefit for all the trust beneficiaries 
whose rights were violated by the trustee's wrongful actions? Although an award of 
attorney fees arising from a legal basis is reviewed for correctness, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998), an award of attorney fees based on equity is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion, Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809-10 (Utah 1992), and a trial 
court's "discretion in deciding whether to grant attorney's fees in an equity case is 
exceedingly broad." Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1999). See also 
Barker v. Utah Pub, Serv. Comm., 970 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah 1998) (stating that this Court 
generally gives "deference on attorney fee determinations to the 'judge who actually 
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the litigation'"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a dispute between the children of McClure ("Mac") Hughes and his 
wife, Helen Hughes ("Helen") regarding their children's rights under two trust agreements. 
The trial court determined that two of the children, Joe and Rikki, wrongfully asserted 
control as trustees over the trust agreements at certain times, consistently refused to allow 
their siblings to participate as trustees as set forth in the trust agreements, failed to 
properly account for trust properties and issues, improperly brought a conservatorship 
action against their father, and paid themselves excessive and unauthorized trustee fees. 
The trial court required Joe and Rikki to return most of the trustee fees they paid 
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themselves and required them to pay for the attorney fees expended in their attempt to 
become their father's conservators. The trial court awarded one of the siblings, Linnea, her 
attorney fees based on the court's inherent power to "award attorney fees when a 
beneficiary sues a trustee for violation of the trust and obtains a recovery for all other 
beneficiaries whose rights were also violated by the trustee." January 25, 2000 
Memorandum Decision, 25 (hereinafter "Mem. Dec") (R. 1936). The court of appeals 
reviewed the trial court's findings and affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety, 
including the determination that Linnea was entitled to an award of attorney fees from Joe 
and Rikki. Cajferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, f 44, 46 P.3d 233 (hereinafter 
"Hughes"). This Court granted Rikki and Joe's petition to review the question "of whether 
Linnea Bennett should be entitled to attorney fees" (Petition, 2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals found that Linnea was entitled to an 
award of attorney fees because she sued for a violation of a family trust by Joe and Rikki 
and obtained a recovery for the wronged beneficiaries. Hughes, fflf 23-24,; Mem. Dec, 23-
25 (R. 1938-36). The court of appeals found that "the award of fees was within the trial 
court's discretion and is supported by the record." Hughes, % 24. The evidence at the trial 
court showed at least five violations of the trusts by Rikki and Joe which formed the basis 
for the recovery by Linnea, John, and Dwight. 
The Court of Appeals Found that Rikki and Joe 
Wrongfully Acted as Trustees. 
Although there were certain times that Rikki and Joe legally acted as trustees for 
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one of the trusts, most of the time they acted "ultra vires" in contravention of the clear 
language of both trust agreements and Utah law. Hughes, \ 33 ; Mem. Dec, 12 (R. 1949). 
The court of appeals found that Rikki and Joe "disregarded the plain language of all of the 
trust documents regarding the priority of trustees." Hughes, \ 17,; Mem. Dec, 24 (R. 
1937). 
The basis for the court's decision is evident from a review of the trust agreements 
and applicable Utah law. On October 12, 1974, Mac and Helen executed The McClure 
Hughes Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement (the "1974 Trust", Exhibit 1). The 
1974 Trust set up two separate trusts: the Family Trust and the Marital Trust. Pursuant to 
Art. XII of the 1974 Trust, the Family Trust was irrevocable after either Mac or Helen's 
death. (Id.) The Marital Trust was revocable during the life of the survivor. 
On September 23, 1978, Helen died. (R. 2473, T. 76.) On February 25, 1979, Mac 
married Leora Thurman. (R. 2473, T. 76-77). On May 22, 1987, Mac and Leora executed 
an Amendment and Restatement of the McClure Hughes Family Trust (the "1987 
Amendment") (Exhibit 2). At that time Joe and Rikki took actual control over the two 
Trusts as trustees with Mac. (R. 2474, T. 816, T. 1216.) On March 18, 1993, Mac executed 
another Amendment to the Family Trust (the "1993 Amendment") (Exhibit 3), and also 
executed the McClure Hughes 1993 Irrevocable Trust (the "1993 Trust"). (Exhibit 4). In 
the 1993 Trust, Mac, Leora and John were designated as Trustees. 
In April 1993, Joe and Rikki initiated a California state court action to establish that 
Mac was legally incompetent and to appoint Joe as the conservator of Mac's estate and 
person (R.2474, T. 1235-39). At that point, Joe and Rikki assumed total control over the 
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Trusts. Linnea opposed the California action and on July 22, 1993 filed a Petition in Utah 
to appoint a conservator for Mac and his estate. On March 16, 1994, Judge Lynn Davis 
entered an Order appointing Leora and Linnea as conservators and declaring that: (1) the 
Fourth District Court had sole jurisdiction over the matters of Mac's guardianship, (2) the 
California proceedings were without jurisdiction and invalid, and (3) that Joe and Rikki 
were to "prepare and provide a detailed accounting [of the Trusts]..." to the other siblings 
by April 15, 1994." Judge Davis also ordered Joe and Rikki to prepare future annual 
accountings and to provide them to the other beneficiaries. (Exhibit 12). On May 2, 1995, 
Mac died. On September 4, 1995, Leora died. 
During their father's declining years and after his death, Rikki and Joe embarked on 
a course of unauthorized control of the Trust Estate in complete disregard of their siblings' 
rights. While usurping control of the trust, Joe and Rikki paid themselves unauthorized and 
exorbitant trustee fees, completely failed to account to their siblings and in other ways 
took advantage of the Trust for their own benefit. (R. 2473-74, T. 263-67, 429-36, 461-
62, 505-08, 579-583, 587-94, 596-99, 1248-68; R. 1935-39; Exhibits 5-9). Joe and Rikki 
had no authority to act as trustees of the Family Trust because Article VII of the 1974 Trust 
(Exhibit 1) provided that trustees shall be appointed in the following priorities: 
1. [Mac and Helen] together. 
2. The survivor of [Mac and Helen] and Robert Clifford Bennett, 
son-in-law of [Mac and Helen], and with Joseph McClure 
Hughes, son of [Mac and Helen], jointly, acting by majority 
vote. 
3. All of the children of [Mac and Helen], jointly, or the survivors 
or survivor, acting by majority vote. 
4. A Trustee chosen by a majority of the beneficiaries with a 
parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. 
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Mac and Helen were the first trustees. When Helen died, the first priority expired 
and the second priority came into being. The evidence showed that Mac was aware of this 
and took somewhat belated steps to notify the next category of trustees. Robert ("Bob") 
Bennett, husband of Linnea, testified that in October 1979, Mac called him and told him 
that since he was a trustee he needed to sign a document. At the time, Bob did not have a 
copy of the Trust and assumed that Mac had the right to request Bob's resignation. Mac 
went to the Bennett's home in St. Louis and delivered Exhibit 23 for his signature, which 
Bob signed on October 11, 1979. (R. 2473, T. 484-92). Exhibit 23 is a verbatim 
restatement of the priorities from the 1974 Trust. Therefore, the second category of 
priorities came into being: Mac, Bob and Joe, to act jointly by majority vote. 
On the very next day, Mac asked Bob to sign Exhibit 25, a Trustee Resignation, 
which Bob signed on October 12, 1979. (Id.) Exhibit 25 purported to "delegate and assign 
to McClure Hughes and Joseph McClure Hughes and Eva Marguerite Cafferty the rights 
and duties of successor Trustees." This document was legally ineffective to delegate Bob's 
rights and duties as Trustee and is legally invalid as an attempt to appoint trustees outside 
the clear provision of the 1974 Trust because, as noted above, the second priority included 
Mac and Bob to act with Joe by majority vote. If either Mac or Bob ceased to serve, the 
priority is extinguished and the next priority would come into being. 
Moreover, the 1974 Trust (Exhibit 1) provided that a trustee may resign or delegate 
his powers to "one or more of the remaining Trustees" (Article VIIB and C); no provision 
is made for delegation of powers to a non trustee. This accords with Utah law. U.C.A. § 
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75-7-403 (trustee shall not transfer his office to another). Therefore, the attempted 
delegation by Bob Bennett in Exhibit 25 was illegal and invalid. In fact, it had the legal 
effect of extinguishing the second priority. See Mem. Dec, 12-13 (R. 1941-42). 
Joe and Rikki both testified that Mac excluded them from management of the Trusts 
at the time Exhibit 25 was executed, and they were not so included until after the execution 
of the 1987 Amendment. (R. 2474, T. 808-15; 1215-17). The Trust continued under Mac's 
sole (and illegal) administration until May 22, 1987, when Mac went to Doug Morrison's 
office and executed the 1987 Amendment (Exhibit 2). By this time (May 1987), the 
Family Trust had become irrevocable by Helen's death. Notwithstanding, it appears that the 
Art. VI, §6.01(a) of the 1987 Amendment attempted modify the trustee provision by 
declaring Joe and Rikki as trustees. Because the Family Trust was irrevocable, this 
amendment was invalid. 
Although the 1987 Amendment could not modify the Family Trust, it did, however, 
modify the provisions pertaining to the Marital Trust. The result was as follows: (a) it had 
no effect on the Family Trust; the third priority had come into being at the time of Bob 
Bennett's resignation and all five of the children were co-trustees, or Bob Bennett's 
resignation was a nullity having not been served on the beneficiaries, and (b) with respect to 
the Marital Trust, the trustees were now Joe and Rikki, who were subject to removal by the 
majority vote of the beneficiaries following Mac's death. 
Joe and Rikki were given copies of the 1987 Amendment at about the time it was 
executed, but the other beneficiaries were not notified until later. (R. 2473, T. 264; 438-
40; 571-72; 1220-68). It was only after their receipt of the 1987 Amendment that Joe and 
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Rikki began to actively administer the Trusts. Their administration of the Marital Trust was 
initially legal; however, as the record shows, they breached the contractual and statutory 
duties of their positions and, following Mac's death, they illegally retained office after 
having been lawfully removed by the majority vote of the beneficiaries. (R. 2473, T. 264-
77; 438-62; 571-98; 820-57). Joe and Rikki's assumption of trustee duties over the 
Family Trust was an illegal usurpation of power from the beginning. 
The 1993 Amendment (Exhibit 3) once again modified the Marital Trust and again 
attempted to illegally modify the Family Trust that had become irrevocable at Helen's 
death. At this time, the trustees of the Family Trust were the five siblings. Therefore, Rikki 
and Joe continued to act illegally as trustees of the Family Trust. (R. 1948-49.) 
After Mac died in 1995, the status of the trustees under both Trusts changed. 
Thereafter, the third priority became effective, and all of the children should have been co-
trustees. Nevertheless, Rikki and Joe continued to act as sole trustees in violation of the 
express language of the Trusts and Utah law. In the words of the trial court: 
From the death of Helen Hughes and subsequent resignation of Robert 
Bennett, the five children should have been co-trustees as to at least half of 
the trust funds. They should have been co-trustees as to the entire trust 
corpus since shortly after the death of McClure Hughes. 
Mem. Dec, 24 (R. 1937). 
The Court of Appeals Found that Rikki and Joe Continually Refused to Recognize 
their Siblings' Rights to Serve as Trustees. 
While acting as trustees ultra vires, Rikki and Joe intentionally excluded their 
siblings from their express rights under the Trust Agreements to act as trustees. The court 
of appeals found that attempts by Linnea, John, and Dwight to rightfully act as trustees after 
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the death of their father were ignored by Joe and Rikki: 
[a]ttempts to assume duties as trustee and manage trust assets by majority vote 
of the remaining children have continued since that time. [Joe] and [Rikki] . . . 
have steadfastly refused to allow their siblings to participate as trustees or to 
acknowledge any duty other than to continue to manage the entire fund as joint 
trustees. 
Hughes,^ 11,, quoting Mem. Dec, 10-11 (R. 1950-51). The court also noted that "within a 
few weeks of the death of McClure Hughes . . . the surviving children did attempt to exercise 
authority, however, [Joe] and [Rikki] refused to acknowledge their siblings' claims and 
continued to exercise control until removed by order of this Court." Id. at f^ 16, quoting 
Mem. Dec, 13 (R. 1948). 
The record confirms a history of repeated attempts by Linnea, Dwight and John to 
assert their lawful positions as co-trustees under both Trusts, and repeated refusals by Joe 
and Rikki. (R. 2473-74, T. 263-67, 429-36, 461-62, 505-08, 579-583, 587-94, 596-99, 
1248-68; R. 1935-39; Exhibits 5-9.) John was the first of the three siblings to demand that 
he be included as a trustee in the administration of the Trust. Joe acknowledged that John 
had wanted to be a trustee, even before the 1987 Amendment, and many times thereafter, but 
Joe and Rikki denied his request. (R. 2474, T. 1221). After the 1993 Amendment, and in 
1995 John again demanded recognition as a trustee and was again refused. (R. 2474, T. 
1223-26; Exhibit 50). 
All parties testified that by Mac's death they had received a copy of the 1974 Trust, 
received access to the 1987 Amendment for the first time, and learned that Linnea and 
Dwight were trustees. John had previously learned he was a trustee of the Marital Trust; 
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however, he learned after Mac's death that he was also entitled to serve as trustee of the 
Family Trust. Shortly after being informed of their status under the 1974 Trust and the 1987 
Amendment, Linnea, Dwight and John took action. 
On June 6, 1995, Linnea, Dwight and John signed an Affidavit of Trustee Succession 
and delivered the same to Joe and Rikki. (Exhibit 13). The Affidavit clearly and 
unequivocally removed Rikki and Joe as trustees of the Trusts and appointed Dwight, John, 
Joe, Rikki and Linnea as successor trustees. The Affidavit was signed by Linnea, John and 
Dwight, comprising a majority of Mac's children. Joe and Rikki received Exhibit 13 and 
rejected it without response. 
Almost a year went by, with Linnea, John and Dwight making repeated requests for an 
accounting and demands to act as trustees. Finally, in desperation, Dwight commenced a pro 
se Unlawful Detainer action on May 8, 1996. (R. 177; 187). On May 20, 1996, Joe and 
Rikki persuaded Linnea to sign a Notice of Removal of Trustees and Appointment of New 
Trustees (Exhibit 16) with the intention of reversing the effect of Exhibit 13. Linnea agreed 
to sign because she thought it would be a workable compromise to have her and Rikki acting 
as the only co-trustees. Exhibit 16 removed all current trustees of the Trust and appointed 
Linnea and Rikki as new successor co-trustees. In Linnea's opinion, this constituted a valid 
and legal action by a majority of the beneficiaries of the Trust to remove and appoint 
trustees. (R. 2473, T. 295-304.) 
Despite the fact that Joe and Rikki signed Exhibit 16, they apparently did not ever 
intend to actually abide by it. Joe and Rikki did not include Linnea in any trustee or trust 
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administration decisions and continued to preclude her from having meaningful access to 
the records of the Trust. (R. 2473, T. 268-76). Furthermore, Joe continued to act as a 
trustee despite his removal pursuant to Exhibit 16. When it became apparent to Linnea that 
she was not permitted to act as a trustee, she decided the only viable alternative was to join 
with Dwight and John in signing Exhibit 17 on October 15, 1996. 
Pursuant to Exhibit 17, a majority of the beneficiaries consisting of Linnea, Dwight 
and John executed a Removal of Trustees and Appointment of Successor Trustees, which 
effectively removed all current trustees (Linnea and Rikki) and appointed as successors all 
five of the children to act by majority vote. Unfortunately, the execution and delivery of 
Exhibit 17 had no effect on Joe and Rikki, who continued to usurp authority over the Trust 
and its assets. On October 15,1996, Linnea, Dwight and John signed and delivered Exhibit 
18. That exhibit reaffirmed the action taken in Exhibit 17 and recited the pertinent 
provisions supporting the action. Nevertheless, Joe and Rikki still refused to relinquish 
control of the Trust. (R. 2473, T. 295-307.) 
Having failed in their non-judicial actions to enforce their rights, Linnea, Dwight, and 
John sought judicial action. R. 2473, T. 430-36.) Thereafter, on March 13, 1998, the Court 
entered its Declaratory Judgment, which declared the 1974 Trust to be a valid and existing 
trust, declared that all five children were co-trustees of both Trusts, and ordered the trustees 
to act by majority vote. (R. 1324-27.) 
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The Court of Appeals Found that Rikki and Joe Failed to Provide Accountings to 
their Siblings as Required by the Trust Documents and Utah Law. 
The Court of Appeals, referring to the findings of the trial court, stated that "except 
for one unhelpful exception, [Rikki and Joe] 'failed to regularly account to trust 
beneficiaries as required by statute [Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-303].'" Hughes, ^ 17 ; quoting 
Mem. Dec, 24-25 (R. 1936-37). "Linnea attempted on many occasions to inquire of [Rikki 
and Joe] regarding trust documents, trust properties and trust issues and was consistently 
rebuffed. Both [Rikki and Joe] testified that whenever any of the other siblings asked them 
about the trust they were referred to McClure, even after the date of his apparent 
incapacity." Mem. Dec, 9 (R. 1952). 
Section 6.07 of the 1987 Trust and the 1993 Amendment (Exhibits 2 and 3) required 
specific monthly and annual accountings of Trust assets to the beneficiaries. Utah law 
imposes a similar duty on a trustee, regardless of whether such duty is included in the Trust 
document. U.C.A. §75-7-303. Even after Judge Davis's March 1994 Order to provide 
accountings to their siblings, (Exhibit 12) Joe and Rikki still refused to fully account to 
Linnea, John, and Dwight. The record is replete with evidence that Joe and Rikki denied 
their siblings access to records and never provided a full accounting as required by the trust 
documents and amendments, by the law of the state of Utah, and by the Court's unambiguous 
order. (R. 2473, T. 264-77; 438-62; 571-98; 820-57; Exhibit 12). 
On November 13, 1996, the trial court entered an order appointing an independent 
accountant for the Family Trust to conduct an independent accounting of the Trust assets (R. 
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781) at a cost of approximately $84,000. 
The Court of Appeals Found that Rikki and Joe Improperly Commenced an 
Conservatorship Proceeding in California 
The court of appeals found that "the efforts of [Joe] in attempting to become 
conservator for his father in 1993 were motivated by a desire to recapture funds from Leora 
T. Hughes, a purpose not consistent with the express purpose of the trust." Hughes, ^ 39,; 
quoting Mem. Dec, 16 (R. 1945). The trial court also found that the principal motivation for 
the conservatorship proceeding was that Rikki and Joe "feared that should something happen 
to their father, the money [previously placed into the Marital Trust by McClure] would 
belong solely to their stepmother and then go to her children. In the Court's view that 
concern diverged somewhat from the stated purpose of the trust. . . . " Mem. Dec, 18 (R. 
1943). 
The trial court recognized a trustee's duty to protect Trust assets, but it also 
recognized the impropriety of ignoring the express language of the 1993 Amendment to the 
Trust agreement that allowed Mac or Leora to withdraw funds from the Marital Trust. 
(Exhibit 3, R. 2473, T. 588-89). The 1993 Amendment also informed the co-trustees (Joe, 
Rikki and John) that Mac and Leora had created and executed the McClure Hughes 1993 
Irrevocable Trust (the "1993 Trust"). The 1993 Trust created a trust for the benefit of Mac 
and Leora for the sole purpose of depositing the funds and investments held by Mac and 
Leora which had been taken as distributions from the Marital Trust. Mac and Leora named 
themselves and John as trustees. The testimony establishes that sometime between 1987 
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and 1990, Mac and Leora withdrew approximately $100,000 from the Marital Trust. (R. 
2474, T. 874-75). Mac and Leora also had other accounts and funds that were separate from 
the Trusts. The evidence strongly suggests that it was Mac and Leora's intention to protect 
such funds from their children until after the last of them had died. 
On March 26, 1993, Doug Morrison, Mac and Leora's attorney, sent copies of the 
1993 Amendment and 1993 Trust to John, Rikki, Joe, Mac and Leora (Exhibit 30) (R. 
1937). The copies to Rikki and Joe were accompanied by a memorandum explaining Mac's 
intentions regarding the Marital Trust: 
I was also requested to clarify with you that once the income from the Marital 
Trust is distributed to the beneficiaries, it is no longer part of the Marital 
Trust. Prior to the establishment of the Irrevocable Trust, it legally belonged 
to your dad individually when he received it, and then to him and Leora jointly 
after it went into their joint account. 
It is unrebutted that both Joe and Rikki were aware of Mac's intentions to keep the money he 
and Leora had taken from Marital Trust and maintain it for his and Leora's benefit, separate 
from the Trusts and the beneficiaries. 
Even though the amendment allowed the withdrawal of funds from the Marital Trust 
by Mac and Leora for their use as they desired, Joe started the conservatorship proceeding 
in a wrongfixl attempt to avoid having Leora withdraw funds for her maintenance as expressly 
allowed by the Trust. (R. 2474, T. 828-30; 1236-39). The court correctly found that Joe's 
actions were a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to abide by the terms of the Trust 
agreement. (R. 1943.) 
In addition to charging the Trust for their attorney fees in the California litigation, 
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Joe charged the Trust so called "extraordinary fees" for initiating an unsuccessful action in 
California to avoid compliance with Mac's 1993 Trust Amendments, and opposing Linnea's 
successful effort in this court to appoint Leora and herself conservators of Mac's estate. 
Joe testified in defense of his charges: "[i]t was an extraordinary amount of work, 
extraordinary circumstance." (R. 1196.) For such efforts, he charged the Trust at the $166 
per hour rate charged by podiatrists for medical care for a total of $34,830.91. (R. 1199, 
Exhibit 223). Joe's extraordinary charges made good on a threat he had made to Linnea: 
Q. How did you respond individually? 
A. He told me that if I pursued, if I tried to stop him from being 
conservator that he would see to it that I would not, it would cost me a lot of 
money, I would end up losing my, my portion of the Trust as a, when I became 
a beneficiary, and that he would take it to court and make sure that, that all 
three of us would, would lose. 
Q. Did he say anything about threatening to take it to court and have the 
Trust pay his expenses? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say about that? 
A. He said that if we didn't stop trying to fight him in court, that he would 
begin charging - he claim that he made - 1 forget how much he said - how 
ever much he earned a day as a doctor, that he would charge that much for 
every time that he had to take off work to come to court, that he would charge 
that amount. . . 
Q. Against the estate? 
A. Against the trust. 
(R. 2473, T. 275-77). Judge Davis's March 1994 Order nullified the California proceedings 
and appointed Leora, and Linnea as Mac's guardians and the conservators of his estate. 
(Exhibit 12). The Utah ruling reversed the efforts of Joe and Rikki and rendered the entire 
California proceeding a waste of time and Trust assets. 
The trial court required Rikki and Joe to pay from their distributive shares the $5,230 
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of trust funds they had spent on attorney fees for the conservatorship proceeding. Mem. 
Dec, 19 (R. 1942). The court also denied Joe's claim for extraordinary fees because there 
was no evidentiary basis to suggest that Joe's fee for podiatrist work was relevant to or 
commensurate for his work in the conservatorship proceeding. (R. 1196-2000.) The court 
characterized this testimony as "unpersuasive." Mem. Dec, 16 (R. 1945). 
The Court of Appeals Found that Rikki and Joe Paid 
Themselves Excessive Trustee Fees 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's findings that Joe and Rikki paid 
themselves excessive trustee fees. Hughes, fflf 34-36. The trial court found that the 1974 
Trust was silent as to trustee's fees and the 1987 Amendment provided that a "[tjrustee shall 
be entitled to a reasonable fee, which may be waived wholly or partially, for trustees' 
services, commensurate with fees charged by trustees for similar services." (R. 1947.) The 
only evidence presented in the five day trial as to what constituted a reasonable fee was 
hearsay testimony by Rikki that someone in the Mercantile Bank in St. Louis told her that 
they would charge one percent. (R. 650-51.) The trial court found that this evidence 
"consisted of unsupported estimates made by persons not called as witnesses to this 
proceeding which this Court does not find sufficiently reliable to form the basis for a 
calculation of trustee's fees." (R. 1947.) The court did not find Joe's claim based on "a 
calculation of hours spent and his comparative income as a podiatrist" helpful in 
determining reasonable fees. (Id.) 
Furthermore, the trial court found that an agreement executed by Joe and Rikki 
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(Exhibit 32) that "did not involve the trustor and was not an amendment or addendum to any 
trust document/' was "nothing beyond a self-serving declaration of [Joe and Rikki] that they 
wished to claim trustee fees at some time in an undetermined amount. The agreement does 
not create a right to fees in any amount." Mem. Dec, 14 (R. 1947). 
The trial court determined that "[t]he best, indeed the only, real evidence of fees 
intended to be paid to the trustees is found within the letters written by [Rikki] and signed by 
McClure Hughes (exhibits 14 and 15). Id. at 15 (R. 1946). Applying the fee agreement 
contained in exhibits 14 and 15, the trial court then recaptured $35,400 from Joe and 
$25,682.71 from Rikki in excessive trustee fees that Joe and Rikki had paid themselves. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals because it properly 
based its decision on well settled law regarding a court's inherent equitable power to award 
attorney fees to a party that obtains a recovery for violation of a trust. The court of appeals 
fully reviewed the facts of this case and found that the trial court was within its sound 
equitable discretion in awarding attorney fees to Linnea based on the trial court's findings 
that Linnea's actions had benefitted the trust and Joe and Rikki had breached their 
fiduciciary duties by paying themselves excessive trustee fees, disregarding the other 
siblings rights to be trustees, and failing to properly account to trust beneficiaries. 
The Petition in this matter asks the Court to determine only whether such an award 
was proper. However, in their Brief, Joe and Rikki add an additional issue and ask this Court 
to also decide whether the trial court properly found that Linnea was entitled to attorney 
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fees. This second issue should be disregarded because (1) it asks the Court to review de 
novo the trial court's findings, an improper undertaking on a writ of certiorari, (2) it was not 
properly raised in the Petition, and (3) it contains some arguments that have been addressed 
and decided by the courts below and others that are raised here for the first time. 
As part of their argument, Joe and Rikki claim that the court of appeals disregarded 
the rule set forth by this Court for determining when a court may award attorney fees on an 
equitable basis. They then disregard the rule of this Court and propose a new rule they assert 
should be applied when deciding whether a court should award attorney fees in cases where a 
beneficiary obtains a benefit for a trust. The proposed rule is not based on applicable law, 
and erroneously attempts to impose a rigid and mandatory analysis on the broad equitable 
powers of a court. Noticeably absent from their proposed rule is any mention of a court's 
discretion in awarding attorney fees on an equitable basis. The rule also attempts to impose 
a non-existent requirement of egregious conduct or bad faith in order to impose an award of 
attorney fees against a trustee individually. When and how such fees should be allowed is a 
question best left to a trial court in the sound exercise of its discretion on an individual case 
basis. 
Joe and Rikki next ask this Court to apply their proposed rule and reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals because it failed to consider whether their decision to award 
attorney fees was "just and equitable." They claim that Linnea's conduct was wrongful and 
her actions did not benefit the Trusts and therefore she is not entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. They further claim that even if Linnea is entitled to attorney fees, they should have 
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been paid from the Trust estate. Even if this Court were to apply Rikki and Joe's proposed 
rule, it would still find that Linnea is entitled to attorney fees from Joe and Rikki. The 
record is replete with evidence upon which the courts below both found that Joe and Rikki, 
wrongfully asserted control as trustees over the trust agreements at certain times, 
consistently refused to allow their siblings to participate as trustees as set forth in the trust 
agreements, failed to properly account for trust properties and issues, improperly brought a 
conservatorship action against their father, and paid themselves excessive and unauthorized 
trustee fees. The court of appeals also reviewed the facts and equities of this case and 
affirmed the trial court's findings that Linnea acted properly in seeking to rectify the wrongs 
committed by her siblings. 
For all of these reasons, Linnea, John, and Dwight respectfully request this Court to 
find that the court of appeals properly affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
Linnea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT WILL CONSIDER ONLY THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS AS RAISED IN RIKKI AND JOE'S PETITION AND WILL REVIEW 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
VERDICT. 
This Court has held numerous times that when it grants certiorari on a decision of the 
court of appeals, it will only review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the trial 
court. Weber County v. Chambers, 2001 UT 53, f7 n.l, 28 P.3d 694. In Butterfield v. 
Okubo, the Court gave the following reminder to the bar: 
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Many lawyers, after a writ of certiorari has been granted, ignore the court of 
appeals' decision to which the writ applies and brief the correctness or 
incorrectness of the trial court ruling as though we were considering that 
ruling instead of the court of appeals'. In fact, on occasion, the briefs filed 
with this court appear to be only copies of those originally filed with the court 
of appeals.... We take this opportunity to remind the bar that when exercising 
our certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-2(3)(a), we review a 
decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the parties should address the decision 
of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. To restate the 
matter: We do not grant certiorari to review de novo the trial court's 
decision. See Utah R.App.P. 46. 
831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). Rather than review the trial court's decision, certiorari 
jurisdiction is generally reserved for deciding issues of law that have not been settled by this 
Court, deciding conflicting opinions of other courts, or to bring the court of appeals back 
into line if it has strayed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings. Utah R.App.P. 
46. 
Furthermore, this Court only reviews the issues raised in an initial petition for writ of 
certiorari, Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 864 n.3 (Utah 1995) (declining to 
consider issues not raised in the petition for writ of certiorari), and will not review issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. See U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 
P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("[I]ssues cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal"). 
For these reasons, this Court should not consider the argument raised in the second 
section (pages 24-41) of Joe and Rikki's Brief. First, the argument asks this Court to find 
that "the Trial Court Erred When it Awarded Attorney Fees to Linnea Bennett." (Petitioners' 
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Brief, 24) (emphasis added). In other words, it asks this Court "to review de novo the trial 
court's decision," Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 101, n.2, and to review whether the trial court 
improperly awarded attorney fees to Linnea; a task that this Court has always declined to do 
in the past. 
Second, the entire last section of the Joe and Rikki's Brief is based entirely on an 
issue that was not raised in their Petition. In their Petition, Joe and Rikki asked this Court to 
review whether the court of appeals violated Stewart by "determining that the only fact that 
was significant in reviewing the trial court's decision was whether there had been a recovery 
for the benefit of the trust estate?" (Petition, 1.) Now, in their Brief, they have revised that 
original issue (recognizing that it had been erroneously stated in their Petition)1 and have 
added an additional issue: "Applying the proper standard [the proposed new rule], did the trial 
court err in granting Linnea Bennet attorney fees under the facts and circumstances of this 
case?" (Petitioners' Brief, 1.) This issue not only asks the Court to review the trial court's 
1
 Initially, in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Joe and Rikki asked this Court to 
review a different question: "[D]id the Court of Appeals violate [this Court's opinion in 
Stewart] by determining that the only fact that was significant in reviewing the trial court's 
decision was whether there had been a recovery for the benefit of the trust estate?" 
(Petition, 1.) Rikki and Joe claimed that the court of appeals "gave lip service" to this 
Court's opinion in Stewart (Petition, 14), and that the court found "that the 'only relevant 
finding' was whether a recovery was obtained'" without a "reasoned analysis of whether an 
award of attorney fees would be 'in the interest of justice and equity,5" (Id.). 
In their opposition to the Petition, Linnea, John, and Dwight pointed out that "[s]uch 
a position is at best mistaken, and at worst, duplicitous" (Opp. to Petition, 14-15) because 
the court of appeals actually stated that "[t]he only relevant finding is whether Linnea 
obtained a recovery based on a violation of the trust"-the criteria set forth by this Court in 
Stewart. Hughes, f 24 (emphasis added). Rikki and Joe have now apparently abandoned 
that claim. (Petitioners' Brief, 18-19.) 
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ruling, it also asks the Court to address an issue that was not fairly included in the original 
issue certified by this Court and argues facts and interpretations of fact that are contrary to 
the findings and verdict of the trial court. 
Third, many arguments proffered in the second part of the Brief (especially those 
found on pages 27-41) are being raised for the first time in this Brief. They were not raised 
at the trial court level, nor in Joe and Rikki's appeal. On the other hand, some of the 
arguments have been raised and rejected by both courts below. Joe and Rikki are trying to 
get a third bite at the proverbial apple. For all of these reasons, this Court should disregard 
pages 24-41 of Joe and Rikki's Brief in their entirety. The only issue properly raised by Joe 
and Rikki's Petition and Brief is whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the award 
of attorney fees to Linnea. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT LINNEA'S 
ATTORNEY FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals because it properly 
based its decision on well settled law regarding a court's inherent equitable power to award 
attorney fees to a party that obtains a recovery for violation of a trust. In Stewart v. Utah 
Public Service Commission, this Court recognized the inherent equitable power of a trial 
court to "award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity." 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). The Court then reviewed some of the 
categories where courts have exercised this inherent power, including the "inherent power to 
award attorney fees when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation of the trust and obtains a 
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recovery for all other beneficiaries whose rights were also violated by the trustee." Id. at 
783 (citing In re Estate ofMcCart, 847 P.2d 184, 187 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Robinson v. 
Kirbie, 793 P.2d 315, 319 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990); Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research v. 
Holman, 732 P.2d 974, 987 (Wash. 1987), md Allard v. Pacific NaH Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 
112(1983)). 
The four cases cited by Stewart all involved situations similar to the present case and 
all awarded attorney fees against a trustee individually under the same well established 
equitable basis; a beneficiary who obtains a benefit for a trust based on a breach of trust by a 
trustee can recover against the trustee individually. 
In McCart, the Colorado court of appeals affirmed a trial court's award of attorney 
fees against a trustee individually where the trustee (who was also a remainderman 
beneficiary of the trust) failed to make payments to the beneficiary in order to "provide 
[him] with a standard of living to which he is accustomed." 847 P.2d at 187. Because the 
trustee had "acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in his own self-interest in violation of his 
fiduciary duties," the trial court properly ordered him to "bear the attorney fees and costs, 
personally and individually." Id. at 187-88. 
In Robinson, co-trustees (who were also residual beneficiaries) refused to account 
to other beneficiaries, embezzled trust funds, and charged unreasonable trustees fees. When 
the other beneficiaries brought legal action against them, they were ordered to individually 
and personally pay the other beneficiaries' attorney fees. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals 
stated that: "While [the bjeneficiaries' action clearly benefitted them, the action also served 
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to protect the entire trust res from improper depletion by [the trustee/residual beneficiary]. 
Under such a circumstance, we believe an attorney's fee is properly allowed." Robinson, 
793P.2dat319. 
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court in Holman, a case where the trustee was 
found to have charged excessive trustee fees, stated that the test for awarding fees in a trust 
case is "whether the litigation and the participation of the party seeking attorney fees caused 
a benefit to the trust." Holman, 732 P.2d at 987. The Holman court relied on Allard, 663 
P.2d 104, where the court stated that "[w]here litigation is necessitated by the inexcusable 
conduct of the trustee . . . the trustee individually must pay those expenses." Id. at 112. The 
Allard court also held that "since the defendant breached its fiduciary duty plaintiffs should 
be granted their request to recover all attorney fees expended both at the trial and on appeal 
on behalf of the plaintiffs and all minor beneficiaries and unknown beneficiaries." Id. 
Other jurisdictions have applied the same basis for awarding fees against a trustee 
individually: See A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Allowance of Attorneys' Fees In, or Other 
Costs of Litigation by Beneficiary Respecting Trust, 9 A.L.R. 2d 1132, §§ 27, 29-32 (1950 
& 1997 Supp.). The considerations underlying an award of attorney fees against a trustee 
individually generally include (1) whether a beneficiary is successful in the litigation, (2) 
whether the litigation was necessitated by "some fault or misconception of duty by the 
trustee," or (3) whether there is misconduct on the part of the trustee's administration of the 
trust. Id. at §§29-32. 
In Dardovitch, a case where a beneficiary was awarded his attorney fees against a 
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trustee individually for his "persistent refusal to provide [the beneficiary] with an 
accounting/' 190 F.3d at 46, the court provided a detailed explication of the "General 
Principles Governing Award of Attorney's Fees Awards in Trust Actions." Id. at 145-47. 
The court, quoting a prominent treatise, stated that 
In exercising its discretion in these matters the court will consider whether 
the plaintiff or other party was successful in obtaining the relief requested or 
in defending or conserving the trust estate, for example, by protecting the 
trust against an unjust claim. The court may also consider whether the 
successful party benefitted or enhanced the trust estate in deciding whether 
his attorneys' fees should be awarded from the trust estate.... In exercising 
its discretion the court may consider other factors such as the nature and 
extent of the defendant's wrongful conduct, and whether there was good faith 
on the part of the defendant. 
Id. at 145 (quoting 16 George Gleason Bogart et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 871, 
at 184-97 (rev.2d ed. 1998). Dardovitch also noted that the most important factor for a 
court reviewing a lower court's award of attorney fees is to recognize that "the [lower 
court's] discretion in deciding whether to grant attorney's fees is exceedingly broad." Id. at 
146. 
In the present case, before deciding any of the issues, the court of appeals first 
reviewed all of the facts of this case and the trial court's findings of fact. Hughes, ffl|l-19. 
Then, addressing the issue of the award of attorney fees, the court correctly stated the well 
established rule as set forth in Stewart: 
"However, in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court 
has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems 
it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity." Id. This includes "the 
inherent power to award attorney fees when a beneficiary sues a trustee for 
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violation of the trust and obtains a recovery for all other beneficiaries whose 
rights were also violated by the trustee." Id. at 783. 
Hughes, \ 23, quoting Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782, 783. 
After reviewing all of the facts of the case and establishing the basis for the award, 
the court of appeals cited several examples of violations of the trust by Joe and Rikki that 
gave rise to an award of attorney fees against them. The court noted that Rikki and Joe 
"disregarded the plain language of all of the trust documents regarding the priority of 
trustees," Hughes, f 17; "steadfastly refused to allow their siblings to participate as trustees 
or to acknowledge any duty other than to continue to manage the entire fund as joint 
trustees," Id. at ^[11; "failed to regularly account to trust beneficiaries as required by statute 
[Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-303]," Id. at \ 17; "[attempted] to become conservator for his father 
in 1993 . . . motivated by . . . a purpose not consistent with the express purpose of the trust," 
Id. at \ 39; and were forced to return a substantial amount of trustees fees they paid 
themselves, Id. at f 24. Each of these actions constitutes a violation of the trust, and, as set 
forth in the statement of facts above, is amply supported by the record. 
The court of appeals then found that Linnea did in fact obtain a recovery for herself 
and the other beneficiaries based on the foregoing violations of trust: 
Linnea sued Joe and Rikki, acting as trustees, "for violation of the trust'1 and 
obtained "a recovery for all other beneficiaries whose rights were also 
violated by the trustee[s]." Id. The only relevant finding is whether Linnea 
obtained a recovery based on a violation of the trust. . . . The record is clear 
that she did. Not only was the award of trustee fees that Rikki and Joe paid 
themselves substantially lowered, but also the costs associated with the 
California conservatorship proceeding were recaptured and charged against 
Rikki and Joe's distributive shares. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's award 
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of Linnea's attorney fees. 
Id. 
The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's reduction in the amount of 
attorney fees claimed by Linnea's attorney. Even though the amount of the claimed attorney 
fees was uncontested at the trial court, the trial court, on its own motion, reduced the rate 
charged by Linnea's attorney. The court of appeals, recognizing the trial court's equitable 
discretion, stated that "even though [Linnea's attorney's] affidavit was undisputed, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in lowering his hourly rate when determining a reasonable 
fee." Jtf.al1[27. 
Finally, the court of appeals, again recognizing the equitable discretion involved in 
awarding attorney fees in a trust case, affirmed the trial court's complete denial of attorney 
fees to Linnea's brother John. In so doing, the court expressly recognized the equitable 
basis for awarding fees in this case: "This case involves an award of attorney fees on an 
equitable basis. Thus, the trial court has greater discretion to deny attorney fees." Id. at f30, 
citing Saunders, 840 P.2d at 809. The court then found that the equities of this case 
supported a denial of attorney fees to John. Id. at ^[31. 
It is clear that the court of appeals correctly stated the rule recognized by this Court 
and the majority of other jurisdictions, and then correctly applied that rule to the facts of 
this case using its equitable discretion. 
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III. JOE AND RIKKI ERR IN THEIR CLAIM THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY STEWART. 
The essence of Joe and Rikki's claim is that the court of appeals "erred in not 
recognizing that the Stewart dicta requires first and foremost that the award of attorney fees 
be just and equitable." (Petitioners' Brief, 18.) Joe and Rikki argue that the court did not 
make an equitable and just decision on the issue of attorney fees because they limited their 
consideration to whether Linnea recovered a benefit for the estate based on a violation of 
the trust. 
Joe and Rikki raise three issues they claim the court of appeals failed to consider 
when awarding attorney fees to Linnea. First, they claim the court should have considered 
Linnea's conduct, which Joe and Rikki consider wrongful. (Id.) Second, they claim that 
obtaining a monetary recovery is insufficient to support an award of attorney fees. (Id. at 
19.) Third, they claim that attorney fees should "normally" be awarded against the trust 
estate and not a trustee unless there is an "egregious" breach of fiduciary duty or "bad faith." 
(Id. at 22.) In order to remedy these claimed deficiencies, Joe and Rikki propose a new rule 
to be applied when deciding whether a court should award attorney fees in cases where a 
beneficiary obtains a benefit for a trust (Id. at 23). This rule has never been adopted by any 
court in any jurisdiction. Under the new rule, Rikki and Joe claim that Linnea would not be 
entitled to attorney fees. Rikki and Joe's arguments fail for three reasons: First, their 
proposed new rule is contrary to established law, and is contrary to the principles and 
policies underlying a court's equitable jurisdiction. Second, the court of appeals considered 
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all of the issues that Joe and Rikki claim were ignored and found that an award of fees 
against the trustees was warranted. Third, if there is any error in the analysis or findings of 
the court of appeals, that error is harmless inasmuch as the award of attorney fees can be 
affirmed on alternative bases. 
A- Joe and Rikki's Proposed Rule Is Contrary to the Law of Utah and 
Other States. 
Although Joe and Rikki claim that the court of appeals failed to determine that the 
award of attorney fees was "just an equitable/' what they are really arguing is that the rule of 
Stewart does not mandatorily require the courts below to review and interpret the facts of 
this case in a way that they feel is just and equitable. To remedy Stewart's alleged defects, 
they propose a new rule that asks this Court to look a third time at certain facts in this case. 
The majority of their brief that follows the proposed rule is a combination of a re-argument 
of issues brought before the courts below that have been decided against them and an 
introduction of new arguments and issues that have never been raised before this time. 
Joe and Rikki's proposed new rule2 is not based on existing law, but it is not entirely 
without merit. To a certain extent, it reflects some of the factors considered by Stewart and 
other courts when determining whether to award attorney fees to a party whose participation 
in litigation has produced a benefit for a trust. For example, the first sentence essentially 
restates the language of Stewart: "Utah courts have the inherent power to award attorney 
2
 The proposed rule has evolved since Joe and Rikki's first statement of the 
proposed rule in their petition for writ of certiorari. The current proposed rule has become 
more complicated and rigid than the original. {Compare Petition, 19 and Petitioners' 
Brief, 23.) 
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fees to a beneficiary whose actions benefit a fiduciary estate." (Petitioners5 Brief, 23.) 
Furthermore, the factors suggested by the proposed rule are some of the factors that a court 
may properly consider when deciding whether to award attorney fees. 
The greatest error of the proposed rule, however, is that it attempts to impose a rigid 
and mandatory analysis upon the broad equitable powers of a court. Noticeably absent from 
the rule is any mention of a court's discretion in awarding attorney fees on an equitable 
basis; an essential characteristic of a court's equitable jurisdiction. See Stewart, 885 P.2d 
at 782, and Saunders, 840 P.2d at 809. Joe and Rikki appeal to In re Brown, 670 P.2d 414 
(Ariz. App. 1983), to support their rule's requirement that a trial court "must. . . analyze all 
of the facts and circumstances" (Petitioners' Brief, 23 (emphasis added)). Brown states that 
a "probate court has jurisdiction, upon a consideration of all the facts and equities" to award 
attorney fees in its discretion. Brown, 670 P.2d at 419. Joe and Rikki argue that this phrase 
requires a consideration of every fact and circumstance in a case before an award of fees can 
be made. (Petitioners' Brief, 23.) 
However, the Brown case, like every other case treating an equitable award of 
attorney fees, recognizes that a court cannot impose a mandatory analysis of all facts. 
Brown emphasized the futility of applying a rigid rule for awarding attorney fees in equitable 
matters: "Whether and to what extent such fees should be allowed is a question best left to 
the probate court to decide in the sound exercise of its discretion on a case-by-case basis. 
Brown, 670 P.2d at 418. Contrary to Joe and Rikki's claim, Brown does not stand for the 
proposition that an award of attorney fees is defective if every fact and circumstance is not 
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analyzed before awarding attorney fees. Rather, it recognizes that a court should consider 
the facts and equities of a case in the exercise of its discretion. Id. at 419. 
Such a standard accords with the policies adopted by Stewart: "Indeed, the power to 
award such fees 'is part of the original power of the chancellor to do equity in a particular 
situation/ [Citation omitted.] and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent 
equitable power whenever 'overriding considerations indicate the need for such a 
recovery."' Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 
1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973)). Similar to Stewart, the Dardovitch court stated that the 
only mandatory consideration in an equitable award of attorney fees is whether a party is 
successful in obtaining relief or conserving a trust estate. All other factors are not required 
but "may" be considered in a court's discretion. Dardovitch, 190 F.3d at 145 (quoting 16 
George Gleason Bogart et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 871, at 184-97 (rev.2d ed. 
1998). 
Equitable jurisdiction allows a court to look at the overriding considerations and 
fashion a remedy that works equity given a particular situation. Imposing a mandatory 
requirement of an analysis of "all facts and circumstances" is contrary with the essential 
nature of an equitable remedy and would create an impossible standard and an appellate 
nightmare. Trial courts would be subject to reversal if they did not expressly state every fact 
and analyze its effect on a grant of attorney fees. Similarly, appellate courts would be 
forced to address every fact and circumstance in order to review the correctness of an 
award. 
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In the present case, the court of appeals stated the correct standard from Stewart, 
including the overriding consideration of "justice and equity," and, as set forth more fully 
below, clearly considered all relevant facts of the case before awarding attorney fees. In the 
considered of opinion of both courts, there was no wrongful conduct by Linnea that would 
give rise to either an award of any counterclaim against her or a denial of attorney fees to 
her. To the contrary, Linnea's conduct in hiring of an attorney benefitted the trust as well as 
her two unrepresented brothers. On the other hand, where the work of the attorney did not 
benefit the trust (as the court found in the case of John's attorney) the court of appeals 
considered the facts and affirmed the court's discretion in denying attorney fees. 
Another serious problem with the proposed rule is its insistence that an award of 
attorney fees should "normally" be awarded from the trust estate and can only be awarded 
against a trustee individually when there is an "egregious" or "bad faith" breach. (Petitioners' 
Brief, 23.) 
If there is a "normal" rule for awarding fees in a trust case based on trustee 
misconduct, it is to award fees against the trustee personally. The ALR annotation cited by 
Rikki and Joe in their Brief states that where litigation is brought by a beneficiary, a court 
may award fees against a beneficiary, a trustee individually, or against the trust estate 
generally. 9 A.L.R. 2d 1132, §27 (1950). Courts usually award fees against a trustee 
individually where (1) a beneficiary is successful in the litigation, (2) the litigation was 
necessitated by "some fault or misconception of duty by the trustee," or (3) there is 
misconduct on the part of the trustee's administration of the trust. Id. at §§29-32. In this 
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case, all three bases are present. The ALR section used by Rikki and Joe (§36) discusses 
cases where a benefit is obtained for the whole estate and there is no trustee misconduct. 
See §§35-37. In this case, neither basis is present; the benefit was for the wronged 
beneficiaries and serious trustee misconduct occurred.3 
Furthermore, Respondents have found no case that requires an egregious breach or a 
breach in bad faith in order to award attorney fees against a trustee individually. See e.g. 
McCart, 847 P.2d atl86 (awarding fees against a trustee individually where trustee had 
"abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously") andAUard, 663 P.2d at 112 
(stating that attorney fees may be awarded against a trustee individually where there is 
"inexcusable conduct"). At best, bad faith of a trustee is a factor that "may," in a court's 
discretion, be considered when determining whether to award fees against a trustee 
individually. McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 514 (Del. 2002). See also 9 A.L.R. 2d 1132, 
§§29-32 (noting that courts usually award fees against a trustee individually where there is 
"some fault or misconception of duty by the trustee," or misconduct on the part of the 
trustee's administration of the trust-not necessarily egregious conduct or bad faith). 
The well established rule is correctly stated by Stewart, the cases cited in Stewart, 
and the case law of other jurisdictions. Joe and Rikki's proposed rule is contrary to that law 
and denies a court the discretion that is the essential basis for equitable jurisdiction. 
3
 Interestingly, the same ALR Annotation cites the Hughes opinion in its section 
treating liability for maladministration of the trust or breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee; 
§18. 
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B. The Court of Appeals Considered and Decided All of the Issues and Facts 
Raised by Rikki and Joe in Their Petition. 
A court may, in its discretion, consider the factors suggested by Rikki and Joe's 
proposed rule. Assuming, arguendo, that such a consideration were necessary, a review of 
the proceedings below shows that the court of appeals considered all of the issues Joe and 
Rikki claim were ignored. Therefore, under any interpretation of Stewart, there is no basis 
for Joe and Rikki's claim of inequity. 
1. The Court of Appeals Considered Linnea's 
Conduct and Found it was Proper. 
Rikki and Joe first claim that Linnea, herself, is guilty of wrongful conduct and if the 
courts below would have considered that conduct they would not have awarded her attorney 
fees. (Petitioner's Brief, 24-26.) Respondents have found no case where the conduct of a 
beneficiary that obtained a benefit based on a violation by a trustee was considered as an 
appropriate factor for determining whether attorney fees should be awarded. The cases 
universally focus on the conduct of the trustee. 
However, again, assuming arguendo, that such a consideration is proper, it should 
first be noted that the issue of Linnea's alleged wrongful conduct was raised by Joe and 
Rikki in both the trial court (R. 1903-02) and the court of appeals. (Appellants' Brief, 18-
20.) The record shows that both courts addressed Linnea's conduct and found that it was 
proper. Hughes at ^ [11; (R. 1959, 1937-36). To the extent there existed conflicting 
evidence, the court of appeals correctly stated, with respect to the amount of trustee fees 
paid, that "'[t]he fact finder is free to weigh . . . conflicting evidence presented and to draw 
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its own conclusions. [Citations omitted.]"5 Id. at \ 36. Therefore, Joe and Rikki cannot 
genuinely claim that the court of appeals did not consider this issue; rather their complaint 
is that it was not decided in their favor. 
The allegations of wrongful conduct by Linnea are based on two "Final Settlement" 
ballots drafted by Dwight and signed by Dwight, John, and Linnea. Rikki and Joe claim that 
by signing these ballots Linnea breached her duties as trustee and committed misconduct 
that precludes an award of attorney fees. (Petitioners' Brief, 24-26.) 
This argument is without merit because none of the attempted acts were effected, and 
Dwight, John, and Linnea never acted as trustees and certainly never took any money from 
the Trusts in any attempt to redistribute assets. In fact, Rikki and Joe admitted that Dwight 
and John withdrew all their motions to assert control as trustees. (R. 2473, T. 19.) More 
importantly, Joe and Rikki admit that Linnea never filed or joined in any motion to attempt 
to effect the settlement ballots (R. 2473, T. 19; Petitioners' Brief, 25.) Rikki even testified 
that it was Dwight and John who were insisting to her that the settlement ballot was fair. (R. 
2474. T. 898-89.) Furthermore, Dwight and John's attempt at redistributing Trust assets was 
simply their attempt to distribute the Trust in a manner that Dwight felt would be fair to all 
five siblings and to rectify the illegal depletion of Trust assets and illegal usurpation of trust 
power by Rikki and Joe. (Exhibit 20, R. 2473-74, T. 415-17, 461-62, 800-806.) 
Linnea was not aware of any of Joe and Rikki's objections to the proposed settlement 
ballots because they refused to discuss it with her. (R. 2473, T. 415-16.) She signed the 
settlement ballots drafted by Dwight because, in absence of any objection by Joe and Rikki, 
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Dwight and John's arguments for signing the ballots made sense to her. (Id.) Joe and Rikki's 
claim that Linnea's conduct was especially wrongful because the settlement ballot was 
contrary to the addenda to Paul Shield's report (Petitioners' Brief, 25, n.9) assumes, without 
any evidence, that Linnea had read the report and its addenda. Linnea's testimony suggests 
the opposite; that she didn't have an understanding of the contents of the report until the 
trial. (R. 2473, T. 332-33.) 
Joe and Rikki's attempts to impute misconduct to Linnea are simply not supported by 
the record. Linnea was the peacemaker of the group and tried time and time again to 
compromise and resolve the differences between the siblings. (R. 2473, T. 429-31.) In her 
attempts, she always included Rikki and Joe. (R. 2473, T. 274.) Given the evidence 
produced at the trial, it is not surprising that the courts below found no improper conduct by 
Linnea. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court noted that "Dwight Hughes, John 
Hughes and, to a certain extent, Linnea Bennett, have tried over and over again to act as a 
majority of the children and to effect a distribution of the trust assets." (R. 1959.) The trial 
court also acknowledged that such actions were in accordance with the Trust: "From the 
death of Helen Hughes and subsequent resignation of Robert Bennett, the five children 
should have been co-trustees as to at least half of the trust funds." (R. 1937.) 
Instead, the trial court found that the unjust and inequitable conduct was properly laid 
at the feet of Rikki and Joe: "[Rikki and Joe] engaged in a persistent pattern aimed at 
remaining as trustees without interference from their siblings." (Id.) The court further 
noted that "[tjhey disregarded the plain language of the trust documents regarding the 
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priority of trustees." (Id.) Therefore, the trial court found inequity on the part of Rikki and 
Joe, not Linnea. There was nothing unjust or inequitable about awarding Linnea her attorney 
fees. The court of appeals reaffirmed the findings of the trial court and similarly found 
wrongful conduct was properly charged to Joe and Rikki. Hughes at THR-l 1, 16-18, 23-24, 
34-36,38-41. 
Joe and Rikki erroneously assume that because the court of appeals stated that "[t]he 
only relevant finding is whether Linnea obtained a recovery based on a violation of the 
trust," it did not consider other facts in the case. A review of the court of appeals9 opinion, 
however, suggests the opposite conclusion. It should be remembered that Joe and Rikki had 
raised the claim of Linnea's alleged wrongful conduct in their brief to the court of appeals. 
Notwithstanding their claim, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that all five 
children should have been trustees from the time of McClure's death, and that Linnea, 
Dwight, and John were within their rights in attempting to assert their rights as trustees. 
Hughes at ^11 and 42. 
Therefore, when the court of appeals stated that the only "relevant finding is whether 
Linnea obtained a recovery based on a violation of the trust," in light of the fact that the 
court had just set forth all of the facts reviewing the actions of Linnea in attempting to assert 
her rights as a trustee, a better interpretation of that sentence is that the other factors were 
not relevant because the court found that Linnea's conduct was not wrongful, not that the 
facts were not considered by the court. This conclusion is made more evident by the court's 
footnote where they acknowledged, but declined to address, Rikki and Joe's challenges to 
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the propriety of the award of attorney fees. Hughes at f24, n.2. In other words, the court 
considered all of Rikki and Joe's challenges but did not find them relevant to its 
determination that in the interest of justice and equity, Linnea was entitled to an award of 
fees where she had "obtained a recovery based on a violation of the trust." Hughes at «|24. 
Further evidence of the court of appeals' consideration of all relevant facts as they 
relate to an award of attorney fees is shown by the court's affirmation of the trial court's 
denial of attorneys fees to John (who had retained an attorney during an earlier phase of the 
trial court proceedings but was unrepresented at the trial of the case). The court of appeals 
found that John's fees were properly denied because his attorney's work "'radically 
increased' the complexity of the trial and burdened other parties." Hughes at ^[31. The court 
of appeals, citing Saunders v. Sharp, recognized that the trial court had increased discretion 
to deny attorney fees when they were awarded on an equitable basis. Hughes at [^30. 
It is incongruous to assert that the court of appeals failed to apply justice and equity 
in awarding Linnea's attorney fees when the same court clearly used its discretion, in the 
interests of justice and equity, to deny John's attorney fees. It is apparent that the court of 
appeals examined the overriding circumstances of the case and properly used its equitable 
discretion to affirm an award attorney fees where equity and justice required it and to deny 
them on the same basis. 
2. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Found that Linnea's 
Participation in the Litigation Benefitted the Trust. 
Joe and Rikki claim that Linnea5 s recovery of trustee fees and attorney fees 
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improperly taken from the trust does not constitute a benefit to the trust. There is simply no 
factual basis for this claim.4 The trial court clearly recaptured trustee and attorney fees that 
were wrongfully paid from the trust by Joe and Rikki back into the trust: "It is this Court's 
direction that the balance of the funds held in trust be increasedby the following amounts . 
Trustee Fees: 
Joseph M. Hughes $35,400.00 
EvaM. Cafferty 25,682.71 $61,082.71 
Attorney Fees: 
Joseph M. Hughes (50 percent) 2,615.00 
Eva M. Cafferty (50 percent) 2,615.00 5,230.00" 
(R. 1939-38) (emphasis added). The recovered monies were recaptured into the Trust, not 
awarded to Linnea, D wight, and John. Joe and Rikki even admit in their brief to the court of 
appeals that the trial court required them "to repay the Trusts" for attorney fees paid to Fred 
Middaugh. (Appellants' Brief, 17.) Of course, the trial court did not require Joe and Rikki 
to actually pay money back into the Trust that they had wrongfully taken. Instead, it reduced 
their 1/5 share by the amount recaptured into the Trust. It cannot be seriously contended that 
a recapture of $66,312.71 back to the Trust is not a benefit. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 
and cases cited therein. 
Furthermore, Rikki and Joe should not have shared in any recovery for the benefit of 
the trust. Stewart does not require Linnea to obtain a benefit for Rikki and Joe. It only 
requires her to obtain a benefit for "all other beneficiaries whose rights were also violated 
4
 Perhaps it is for this reason that this argument is not found in Joe and Rikki's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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by the trust." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 (emphasis added). It is clear from the trial court's 
ruling that Rikki and Joe's rights were not violated, rather they violated the rights of the 
other siblings. (R. 1936-37.) Stewart requires no recovery of benefits for Rikki and Joe as 
a condition to an award of fees. 
Furthermore, Linnea assisted in providing other non-monetary benefits to the Trust. 
Actions that benefit a trust by bringing about an accounting or exposing breaches of 
fiduciary duty can constitute a benefit even where there is no monetary relief. In 
Dardovitch, even thought the beneficiaries did not receive the relief they sought because 
"the litigation provided a benefit to the Trust as it brought about an accounting of the Trust 
that exposed breaches of fiduciary duty" an award of attorney fees against a trustee 
individually was proper. 190 F.3d at 146-47. Linnea, in addition to recovering money for 
the Trust, brought about an accounting and stopped the ongoing breaches of fiduciary duty by 
Joe and Rikki. All of these actions benefitted the Trust. 
Additionally, Linnea's legal efforts prevented Joe and Rikki from executing their 
threats to charge the trusts for their legal defense expenses. As they had demonstrated a 
willingness to do so with the California court action and their subsequent Utah court defense 
actions without consideration for the propriety of those legal efforts, their threats were real 
and were seriously considered. As Linnea prevailed in her Court challenges, it is clear that 
her actions definitely did benefit the trusts from improper distribution of trust funds and the 
loss of potential earnings on such distributed funds. 
Rikki and Joe's appeal to McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503 (Del. 2002) as support for 
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their claim that attorney fees should not have been awarded absent a benefit to the trust is 
also misplaced. In McNeil, Hank (apparently the black sheep of the family) was one of four 
siblings who were beneficiaries of a trust. The trustees of the trust kept from Hank the fact 
that he was entitled to trust distributions during the life of his mother and otherwise kept 
him "outside the loop" with respect to his beneficiary status. Id. at 506-07. Hank sued and 
the court ordered a make up distribution to Hank, surcharged the trustees, and removed one 
trustee, but did not award attorney fees to Hank. Id. at 508. 
Joe and Rikki claim that McNeil shows that "wrongful conduct... does not 
necessarily warrant an award of attorney fees to a beneficiary absent a significant benefit to 
the trust." (Petitioners' Brief, 21.) While it is true that wrongful conduct does not 
"necessarily" warrant an award of attorney fees, especially where there is no benefit to the 
trust, the holding in McNeil allows for the opposite result as well. That is, in exercise of its 
equitable discretion, the court could have exercised its discretion and awarded attorney fees 
under the facts of that case because an award is discretionary: "The [trial court] may 
exercise its discretion to award attorneys5 fees" and in analyzing whether such an award is 
appropriate the court "may" (not "must") consider whether the breach of trust was fraudulent 
or in bad faith, the court "may" consider the extent of the wrongful conduct, and the court 
"may" consider whether the action benefitted the trust. Id. at 514. The relevant point is that 
under the rule of McNeil, the court of appeals in the present case would have been within its 
discretion in awarding fees. 
Of course, there are significant differences in this case and McNeil that render an 
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award of attorney fees more appropriate in the present case. Most importantly, the action 
did not benefit solely the party awarded fees; the recapture of trust funds benefitted the 
entire trust whereas in McNeil the action benefitted only Hank. Id. This Court should find, 
as did the Supreme Court of Delaware, that there is "no basis for disturbing [the trial court's] 
discretionary ruling." Id. at 515. 
3. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Properly Found that Joe and 
Rikki's Serious Breaches of Fiduciary Duty Warranted an Award of 
Attorney Fees Against Them Individually. 
As explained above, there is no requirement of egregious conduct or bad faith to 
award attorney fees against a trustee individually. However, even if such a finding were 
required, Rikki and Joe's actions would qualify. In fact, two of the cases cited by Rikki and 
Joe in support of their position that attorney fees are "normally" assessed against the estate, 
actually assessed attorney fees against trustees individually for misconduct almost identical 
to that of Rikki and Joe. Dardovitch, 190 F.3d at 146-47 (trustee paid himself excessive 
fees and refused to account to beneficiaries) (cited by Joe and Rikki in their Petition, 17-
18); and Allardy 663 P.2d at 110-11 (failure to account to beneficiaries was an egregious 
breach). 
Joe and Rikki's argument that they did not engage in egregious or bad faith conduct 
(Petitioners' Brief, 27-41) is a reargument of facts and issues raised and decided against 
them by both the trial court and the court of appeals. Their basic argument, however, is now 
supplemented by new arguments and additional factual claims never before raised by Joe and 
Rikki. {Id.) These claims are beyond the scope of certiorari review and beyond the scope of 
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appellate review. Weber County v. Chambers, 2001 UT 53, fJ, n.l , (stating that on 
certiorari, only the decision of the court of appeals is reviewed); Savage, 908 P.2d at 864, 
n.3 (Utah 1995) (declining to consider issues not raised in the petition for writ of 
certiorari); U.S. Xpress Inc., 886 P.2d at 1119 (stating that M[I]ssues cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal"). 
Furthermore, these issues all stem from Rikki and Joe's claim that they should have 
been the sole trustees; a claim that is now being raised for the third time even though it was 
never timely appealed. The determination that Joe and Rikki were not sole trustees of the 
family Trust after Bob Bennett resigned, was resolved by the trial court in its March 13, 
1998 Declaratory Judgment. (R. 1326.) The court affirmed the validity of the 1974 family 
Trust and stated that the five siblings were joint trustees that should act upon majority vote. 
(R. 1325.) The court's declaratory judgment was a final appealable order of the court and 
because it was not timely appealed, Rikki and Joe cannot claim the determination of joint 
trusteeship among the five siblings was erroneous. 
In estate matters, "a 'final order' is not necessarily dependent in all instances upon 
whether all issues in a law suit have been adjudicated. The test to be applied is a pragmatic 
test." In re Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah App. 1997). In Morrison, the trial court 
held that an order requiring the return of certain property to the estate was improper and the 
heirs immediately appealed that order. This Court found that although the estate litigation 
continued, that order was a final, appealable order because it resolved an "issue of vital 
importance" and removed a "cloud of uncertainty" that would otherwise hinder the 
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resolution of the estate. Id. at 1017. In making its determination, this Court cited three 
other Utah estate cases where an order was deemed final even though the estate litigation 
continued. Id. 
One of those cases, In re Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961) is 
particularly applicable to the present case. In Voorhees, the Utah Supreme Court "held that 
an order compelling a decedent's widow to transfer land to the estate was final although the 
trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over other estate matters." Morrison, 933 P.2d 
at 1017 citing Voorhees, 366 P.2d at 980. The basis for the Supreme Court's decision was 
the fact that the trial court's order "decided 'the real issue' in the case and 'did not leave 
open for reconsideration the question as to who owned the property.'" Id. Therefore, 
"[t]here was nothing further to be decided on that particular issue.'" Id. 
Morrison and Voohees are on all fours with the present case. Here, as in those 
cases, an order concerning the estate was made by a court that continued to assert 
jurisdiction over other estate matters. Judge Maetani resolved every issue between the 
parties in his 1998 order and did not leave open for reconsideration whether the Trust was 
valid and who were to be the trustees: "The trustees of the Trust, including, but not limited to 
the marital portion and the family trust portion are the [five] surviving children of McClure 
Hughes and Helen Hughes " (R. 1323.) The order left no doubt that the issue of who 
should have been trustees under the Trust was not open for reconsideration. (R. 2472, T. 27, 
31-32, 39.) Because that issue was decided with finality in 1998, and no timely appeal was 
made, Rikki and Joe could not raise that issue on appeal. The court of appeals correctly 
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ruled that it was the law of the case. Hughes, ^ 43. 
C. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Properly Found that Joe and 
Rikki's Serious Breaches of Fiduciary Duty Warranted an Award of 
Attorney Fees Against Them Individually. 
As explained above, there is no requirement of egregious conduct or bad faith to 
award attorney fees against a trustee individually. However, even if such a finding were 
required, Rikki and Joe's actions would qualify. In fact, two of the cases cited by Rikki and 
Joe in support of their position that attorney fees are "normally" assessed against the estate, 
actually assessed attorney fees against trustees individually for misconduct almost identical 
to that of Rikki and Joe. Dardovitch, 190 F.3d at 146-47 (trustee paid himself excessive 
fees and refused to account to beneficiaries) (cited by Joe and Rikki in their Petition, 17-
18); and Allard, 663 P.2d at 110-11 (failure to account to beneficiaries was an egregious 
breach). 
D. This Court Can Also Impose Attorney Fees Based Solely on Joe and 
Rikki's Conduct During the Litigation. 
This Court "may affirm the court of appeals' decision on any legal ground or theory 
supported by the record." State v. Weeks, 2002 WL 31246086 (Utah), ^ [10. In exercise of 
its equitable power, a court can also award attorney fees where a party acts "in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782. In Robinson, a 
case cited by Stewart, the court similarly noted two bases for recovering attorney fees 
against a trustee individually: (1) where a beneficiary's actions protect that trust res from 
depletion, or (2) wrhere the court finds the "offending party to be guilty of fraud, malice or 
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oppression." Robinson, 793 P.2d at 319. In such a case, a court can award attorney fees 
without regard to any recovery. 
In this case, the wrongful conduct of Rikki and Joe during the court's jurisdiction 
over the Trust, constituted oppressive, malicious, and bad faith conduct by Rikki and Joe. 
The trial court cited Rikki and Joe's flagrant disregard of the court's order to provide an 
accounting to the other siblings as an example of their oppressive conduct. (R. 1937.) It 
further cited Joe's threat to waste the Trust estates on litigation if the siblings tried to assert 
their rights to act as trustees. (R. 1944.) Even if Linnea had not obtained a recovery for the 
Trust, the actions of Rikki and Joe were in bad faith, vexatious, wanton, malicious, and 
oppressive. Such actions further warrant an award of attorney fees to Linnea. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Linnea, John, and Dwight respectfully request this 
Court to affirm the court of appeal's decision in its entirety. 
DATED this3c[ day of December, 2002. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Lance N. Long 3 
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